Learning and forgetting in Theaetetus 188a1-6
Keywords:
knowledge, memory, puzzle, false judgementAbstract
The puzzle of false judgement “according to knowing and not knowing” presents numerous difficulties of interpretation. According to an influential reading, this is only generated because Socrates excludes from the discussion learning and forgetting, which are intermediate states between knowing and not knowing, or because the disjunction between knowing or not knowing is not an instance of the principle of excluded middle. Here I argue against this interpretation. First I question whether the exclusion of a third alternative to knowing and not knowing plays any role in the puzzle. And then I explain in what sense learning and forgetting are intermediate entities without being a third possibility between knowing and not knowing.
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