Language and being in Plato: How to refute a radical adversary

Authors

  • Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti Prof. en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Keywords:

Refutation, Plato, Language, Negation

Abstract

This paper addresses the recourse to language that is Plato’s ordinary strategy when facing a radical adversary. A radical adversary is a special type of opponent who contradicts himself at the same time as he communicates his own thesis, and the mere statement of whose thesis belies the content that it aims to transmit. Starting from the analysis of some of Plato’s examples of refutations of such an adversary, I intend to examine the argumentative strategy he develops using as guide the discussion in the Sophist about not-being and negation.

References

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Published

2017-10-29

Issue

No. 39 (2017)

Section

Articles

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