Desire and the constitution of the individual in Plato's Republic and Philebus
Keywords:
Individuation principle, Desire, Pleasure, IndividualAbstract
Instead of considering the individuation principle as a formal-static one whereby the individual is what it is, I consider Plato’s individuation principle as an efficient-dynamic principle whereby the individual is constituted as such. And I assert that this is the desire that generates not only characters and actions but also parts of the soul and their proper pleasures. It is a matter of determining how desire exerts its causality, not only in relation to pleasure, but also in relation to the constitution of the human individual.Downloads
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