An examination of character (éthos) and moral virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics

Abstract

The meaning of character in Nicomachean Ethics is examined based on the definition of moral virtue presented by Aristotle in II 6. A brief discussion is presented and the possibility or impossibility of character changing is argued. The mutability of character does not seem reasonable, due to the undisputed/incontrovertible stability and fixity of the moral dispositions (?????), as well as the rigidity of a firm and unchanging disposition that is presupposed, for instance, by a virtuous action (II 4 1105a 34). On the other hand, the immutability thesis would lead Aristotelian ethics towards a determinism where human actions would be determined by a fixed character, which raises the question if a characterformed agent is responsible for her/his actions. Therefore, it seems that there is no determinism in Aristotelian ethics, if determinism is understood as something that, by determining our actions, takes away any trace of voluntariness and responsibility in the agent.