The notion of time in Aristotle
Keywords:
Time, Mimesis, Identity, DifferenceAbstract
This article presents an account of Aristotle's notion of time based on an understanding of metaphysical principles that derives from the dyadic idea of "identity-difference" and from the properly mimetic character of movement. On this view, time can only be understood in terms of what is timeless and eternal and movement can only be understood in terms of what is motionless-as is in general the case with the imperfect, which can only be understood in terms of the perfect.
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