Thinking the Being in the Parmenides’ poem
Keywords:
Thinking, Being, Human opinions, Physical WorldAbstract
Is it possible to assert that there is no such thing as false knowledge without implying that all knowledge is necessarily infallible? If “what is not” cannot be known, knowledge must be of “what is”. This conclusion is condensed in the thesis according to which “thinking (knowing) and being are the same” (B3, B8.34). Reading einai existentially, one interpretation extracts being from thinking, attributing to noein the power of generating reality (or asserting that “being thinks”). To avoid this consequence, another interpretation deprives einai of any reference to reality. But does it not deflate the identity thesis into an innocuous tautology? This dilemma may be eschewed if ‘thinking’ and ‘being’ are reformulated in a way that affects their mutual relation as well as “the opinions of mortals”.
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